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This paper investigates the way in which job mobility contributes to the emergence of a 
gender wage gap in the Italian labour market. We show that men experience higher wage 
growth than women during the first 10 years of their career, and that this difference is 
particularly large when workers move across firms. This gender mobility penalty is robust to 
the inclusion of individual, job and firm characteristics, to different ways of accounting for 
individual unobserved heterogeneity, and is mainly found for voluntary job moves. Exploring 
the wage growth of job movers, we find that a significant gender wage penalty emerges when 
workers move to larger firms. This might be explained by the fact that bigger establishments 
offer jobs more highly valued by women than men or that the relationship between job 
satisfaction and firm size is less negative for women than men. Using data on job satisfaction, 
we find evidence for the latter hypothesis as well as some indication that wages and fringe 
benefits compensate for lower levels of job satisfaction in larger firms, but that this is so only 
for men. 
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This paper analyses gender diﬀerences in log wage growth in order to ﬁnd an explanation for the
emergence of a gender pay gap in the early careers of Italian men and women. Using adminis-
trative earnings records on a large sample of Italian workers employed in the private sector, we
show that a sizeable gender pay gap develops in the years following labour market entry, and
that throughout this period women experience signiﬁcantly lower wage growth than men. Fol-
lowing the US literature, which has shown that wage growth in the early years of labour market
experience accounts for over two thirds of lifetime wage growth and that over a third of this
increase can be attributed to job-to-job wage gains (Topel and Ward 1992), we focus on the role
of job mobility and explore the contribution of individual and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics to the
emergence of what we call the “gender mobility penalty”.
This study is motivated by the existence of persistent gender pay diﬀerences in the Italian
labour market. Although estimates vary according to the measure of earnings adopted and the
survey analysed, recent evidence indicates that the diﬀerence between average male and female
hourly earnings of private sector employees was about 16 percentage points in 2002, and that this
gap has remained constant since the mid-1990s (Rustichelli 2005). Another consistent ﬁnding is
that while gender pay diﬀerences are relatively modest at a younger age the gap increases rapidly
over time (Biagioli 2007, Tronti 2007). The main factors which lie behind the widening of gender
pay diﬀerences are still poorly understood, however. In particular, little is known about the role
of job mobility beside the fact that job-to-job moves have been found to be more rewarding for
men than women (Naticchioni and Rustichelli 2003).
There are several ways to analyse gender diﬀerences in wages and in wage growth. The
most common approach is based on the theory of human capital as developed by Becker (1993)
and Mincer (1974). Several papers have shown that diﬀerences in the accumulation of working
experience is very important in explaining gender diﬀerences in wages (Mincer and Polachek
1974, Mincer and Ofek 1982, Light and Ureta, 1995, O’Neill 2003, Polachek 2006), although
others have argued that human capital factors account only for a small component of the gender
pay gap (Altonji and Blank 1999, Kunze 2005, Blau and Kahn 2006). Another relevant strand
of the literature considers the role of job mobility in explaining wage growth in the ﬁrst years of
labour market experience (Topel and Ward 1992, Dustmann and Meghir 2005). However, while
some have found signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the returns to mobility (Loprest, 1992), others
have argued that there is no signiﬁcant male-female gap in returns once diﬀerences in mobility
patterns are taken into account (Keith and McWilliams 1997, 1999), and that gender diﬀerences
in the process of job search is what matters most instead (Crossley et al. 1994, Manning 2003a).
More recently, new areas of investigation have been attempted. For example, Mueller and Plug
(2006) and Manning and Swaﬃeld (2008) have explored the contribution of gender diﬀerences in
1personality traits on the gender pay gap and on gender diﬀerences in wage growth, respectively,
but ﬁnd only modest eﬀects of these variables.
Our data are derived from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) archives to form
a 1:90 random sample of private sector employees. Information on individual employment spells
is collected every year, so it is possible to derive continuous labour market histories for each
worker over the period between 1985 and 1998. From these records it is possible to gain access to
basic information about the individual, her job and ﬁrm. Crucially for our purposes, the archives
contain an employer identiﬁcation number, which allows us to separate within- and between-ﬁrm
job changes.
Our analysis sheds new light on the existence and the evolution of a gender wage gap in the
early careers of Italian men and women. In particular, we ﬁnd that the average female to male
wage ratio is as high as 94.8% at the time of entry into the labour market, but decreases to
about 84.9% after the ﬁrst ten years of working experience. By this time, real wages are 44.7%
higher for men but only 29.7% higher for women. We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rates
of labour force attachment of men and women in our sample, but we observe signiﬁcant and
almost constant log wage growth diﬀerentials. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the
observed gender wage growth diﬀerential and job mobility, as men and women experience similar
rates of within-ﬁrm wage growth but signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rates of between-ﬁrm wage growth.
This gender mobility penalty is shown to be robust to the inclusion of several individual
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and to diﬀerent ways of accounting for individual unobserved
heterogeneity. We also ﬁnd that although there are gender diﬀerences in mobility patterns, a
gender gap in returns to between-ﬁrm mobility persists even after separating diﬀerent types of job
moves. In particular, we ﬁnd that women experience lower wage growth than men especially when
considering voluntary moves, and argue that fertility and marriage are not the main events which
trigger these changes. By exploring the contribution of job and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics to the
gap in between-ﬁrm log wage growth, we ﬁnd that women who move to larger ﬁrms experience
signiﬁcantly lower wage increases than men.
The ﬁnal part of our analysis investigates the reason which may lie behind this last result,
namely that women’s returns to job mobility are lower than men’s when moving towards larger
establishments. Our hypothesis is that larger establishments might oﬀer jobs with characteristics
more highly valued by women than men or alternatively that the relationship between job satis-
faction and ﬁrm size is less negative for women that for men. We test this hypothesis by looking
at gender diﬀerences in the relationship between ﬁrm size and job satisfaction using self-reported
job satisfaction indicators derived from an additional source of data. We ﬁnd that not only there
is a stronger negative correlation between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size for men than for women,
but also that wages and fringe beneﬁts act as a compensation for lower levels of job satisfaction
2in larger ﬁrms only for men.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the variables used in
the analysis. Section 3 presents a descriptive account of the presence and evolution of a gender
wage gap in the early careers of Italian workers, documents the existence of a persistent gender
diﬀerence in wage growth rates, and shows that the latter is mainly associated with episodes
of between-ﬁrm job mobility. In section 4 we analyse the existence of a gender wage growth
gap controlling for observed and unobservable characteristics of the individuals, and separating
diﬀerent types of job moves. Section 5 focuses on the wage growth of job movers, and the
contribution of speciﬁc job and ﬁrm characteristics to it. As it turns out that a signiﬁcant part
of the gender wage penalty is observed when workers move to a larger ﬁrm, section 6 explores
the existence of gender diﬀerences in the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size and
in the role of wages and fringe beneﬁts as a compensation device. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data description
Our data are derived from the Italian Social Security Administration (INPS) archives. This
dataset covers a 1:90 random sample of all employees working in the private sector in Italy, and
consists of about 160,000 person-year observations (and about 29,000 individuals). The data
include information on the sex and the age of the worker, the initial and the ﬁnal date of the
employment spell, the total gross earnings accumulated over that period, the total number of days
and weeks worked, an indicator for part-time status, and an occupational qualiﬁcation code.1 We
also have an employer identiﬁer and a set of variables related to the ﬁrm, such as the industry
in which it operates, the geographic location, the average number of employees, and the initial -
and in some cases also the ﬁnal - year of activity (descriptives statistics of the main variables are
reported in Table A1).
To perform our empirical analysis we select a ﬂow sample of entrants in employment. In
particular, we select all individuals who enter the panel between the age of 15 and 18 in 1985,
between the age of 15 and 19 in 1986, between the age of 15 and 20 in 1987, and so on up to
1998, which is the last year of our analysis. In this way we are able to follow an individual since
her ﬁrst entry into the labor market, and construct her labour market history. We further select
only employment spells which follow the ﬁrst non-seasonal job, where by seasonal job we intend
an employment spell which lasts less than 4 weeks, or a spell which lasts between 4 and 17 weeks
1The dataset oﬀers information on a number of other potentially interesting variables, such as the type of
contract and the type of ﬁrm bargaining agreement, but these variables are often not available for the entire
period analysed here or have not been coded consistently through time so that they cannot be used to carry out
a longitudinal analysis. The main drawback of the dataset is that it does not provide information on individual
level of education. As explained in what follows, we will use information on age at entry into the labor market to
proxy for education.
3and occurs during the period between June and September. In so doing, we exclude spells of
employment which are compatible with school as part of the employment history of the worker.
We divide the sample into three groups, used to represent diﬀerent levels of education: (i)
individuals who start working between the age of 15 and 18, (ii) those who start working between
the age of 19 to 25, and (iii) those whose ﬁrst employment spell in the data is observed between
the age of 26 and 29. In particular, we refer to employees entering the panel between 15 and 18
years and to those entering the panel between 19 and 25 years as having low and high (secondary)
education, respectively. Since those who enter the labour market after age 25 are observed for a
very short period of time (as they enter the panel quite late by construction) and are very few
(about 3.5% of the sample), we exclude them from our analysis.2
Each record in the original dataset corresponds to a single employment spell when this begins
and ends within the same calendar year, while spells which span more than one year are divided
into diﬀerent annual records. In order to derive the working histories of our individuals and
analyse their wage growth over time we re-organise the data into a person-year longitudinal
dataset with only one record of employment per year. This implies that if there is more than one
employment spell during the year, only the longest spell is included in the data. As our focus is
on early career wage growth, all individuals included in this study must have at least two yearly
records. Therefore, our ﬁnal sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 130,485 individual-year
observations, 42.4% of which pertain to women.
We deﬁne potential work experience as the total number of years since the ﬁrst entry in the
panel, and consider only the ﬁrst 10 years in the worker’s career. Tenure is calculated as the
number of weeks an individual is observed working for the same employer and then transformed
into years. The earning variable used is the real weekly (gross) wage.3 This is obtained by
dividing the total amount earned during that year or during that employment spell (if within the
year) by the number of weeks worked over that period, and deﬂating it by the Consumer Price
Index (base year 1995).
As we have access to ﬁrm identiﬁers we can analyse changes of employers, which represent
2In order to check whether grouping individuals by their age of entry in the panel is a reasonable approximation
of their level of education we use data from the household survey conducted by the Bank of Italy over the period
between 1989 and 1998. This dataset provides information on a representative sample of Italian households and
collects details of the economic and social status of their components, including the age at which they started
working and their educational qualiﬁcation. Using this data, we calculate that among those entering the labour
market between the age of 15 and 18, 72.5 per cent had a lower secondary education qualiﬁcation, about 25 per
cent had a high school diploma, while the remaining fraction reported primary or no education. For those entering
the labour market between 19 and 25 years the distribution by level of education was as follows: 74 per cent had
achieved a high school diploma, 23 per cent had lower secondary education, while the remaining group was equally
divided among those who had already completed a degree (1.5 per cent) or had primary or no qualiﬁcations (1.5
per cent). Similar groupings were used by Favaro and Magrini (2005), while Bonjour and Pacelli (1998) tested on
Swiss data the size and the direction of bias when age is used as a proxy for education and experience and found
that using age as a proxy for education leads to a small bias in the estimated coeﬃcients.
3This is because daily wages are potentially more aﬀected by measurement error due to the fact that some
employers might declare fewer working days in order to comply with minimum wage requirements.
4about 15.5% of all recorded person-year observations. Changes of jobs within the same ﬁrm
(recorded as a new employment spell) also occur in the data and represent about 9.0% of all the
individual records. However, while in some cases it is possible to see that a change of job within
the same ﬁrm corresponds to a change in one of the job characteristics, such as the worker’s
occupational qualiﬁcation or part-time status, very often we cannot observe any change in these
indicators. This means that what we would label a “within ﬁrm job change” could be nothing
more than the result of complex administrative procedures. For this reason, in what follows we
will focus more on job mobility deﬁned as a change of employer rather than a change of job within
the same employer.
3 Early career wage growth
We are interested in the factors which might explain the emergence of a gender wage gap. We
therefore focus on the early stages of a worker’s career and follow our subjects for up to 10 years
since their ﬁrst entry in the labour market. Figure 1 presents log wage proﬁles disaggregated by
sex at diﬀerent levels of potential experience. As predicted by standard human capital models,
we ﬁnd concave-shaped earnings proﬁles for both men and women. Log wage rates ﬁrst increase
with experience and then level-oﬀ, and this happens slightly earlier for women than for men. As
for male-female diﬀerences, the ﬁgure shows the existence of a small gender wage gap at entry
of about 6 log points, which increases over time to reach about 20 log points at the end of the
period (top-left panel).4
We also display the same log wage proﬁles for low and high education workers separately
(respectively top-right panel and bottom-left panel in ﬁgure 1). We see a particularly steep
log wage proﬁle for individuals with low education. This is mainly explained by the fact that
this group of workers includes apprentices, who have very low wages at the beginning of their
careers.5 Among these workers, the gender wage gap is about 8 log points at the beginning,
and this becomes about 23 log points during the ﬁrst 10 years of labour market experience. By
contrast, among highly educated workers the log wage proﬁle is much ﬂatter and the gender wage
gap grows more slowly over time, increasing from 12 to about 18 log points over the observed
4The existence of a small gender wage gap at entry is consistent with that found by Loprest (1992) for the US
(11%) and Dolton and Makepeace (1986) for the UK (7%). Kunze (2003) has found instead a much higher gender
wage diﬀerential at entry of about 23% for Germany, which remains quite constant through the early working
career.
5Apprenticeship contracts were introduced in Italy in the early 1950 and were intended to provide workers
with some form of internal and external job training while the employer enjoyed a substantial rebate on social
security contributions. These contracts were mainly used to provide employers with an incentive to hire young and
unqualiﬁed workers, and in the vast majority of cases did not lead to any formal qualiﬁcation. Following the Biagi
reform of 2003, apprenticeship contracts have been substantially reformed with the aim to emphasise the training
element and deﬁne more accurately the professional qualiﬁcations associated to them (see Brunello and Topo 2005
for more details).
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The pattern of log wages seen in ﬁgure 1 translates into the log wage growth rates presented
in ﬁgure 2. Wage growth is here computed as the diﬀerence between two consecutive wage
observations, irrespective of whether there has been a gap in the labour market experience of the
individual. As we can see, wages ﬁrst increase at a rate of about 8 log points for the ﬁrst two
years and then start to slow down. There is also substantial heterogeneity in wage growth across
education groups; low educated workers exhibit substantially higher wage increases earlier in
their career and lower growth later on, while the wage growth proﬁle of highly educated workers
appears rather more constant over time. The main thing to notice, however, is that wage growth
is consistently higher for men than women during the early stages of a worker’s career, and this
holds for both levels of education.
These patterns might be driven by changes in rates of labour force participation between men
and women over time. In particular, it could be that more women than men exit the sample
during the period of observation, or that women experience more frequent and longer career
interruptions than men. We can check for this, and in the top panel of table 1 we report the
percentage of women in the sample by year of potential experience. This percentage is very stable
over time, with women accounting for 41-43% of the entire sample at each year of experience.
Amongst the low educated group a similar pattern emerges, while for the highest educated we
notice even some increase in the proportion of women in the last few years. The bottom panel
of the table shows the distribution of gaps (in years) between consecutive wage observations.6
As we can see, long gaps are relatively infrequent, and generally more likely to be observed
among men than women (94.1% of men never experience a gap of more than one year between
wage observations against 95.9% of women). This is true for the overall sample, as well as for
the subsamples deﬁned by diﬀerent levels of education. It would therefore be unlikely that the
observed gender diﬀerences in log wages and wage growth proﬁles are the result of diﬀerent labour
force attachment of men and women in our sample.
Our analysis focuses on the contribution of job mobility in the early stages of a worker’s career
to the emergence of a gender wage growth gap. The data show that male workers change ﬁrm
more frequently than women during their early career. About 53.0% of men in our sample move
to another employer at some point over the ﬁrst 10 years on the labour market, for women this is
only 47.7%. However, the year-to-year diﬀerences in the incidence of job moves are rather small.
The average annual incidence of job moves is 16.8% for men and 13.9% for women, a diﬀerence
6If we look at between-ﬁrm job changes, we observe that about one third of all changes of employer takes place
within 1 month (32.9% for men and 33.7% for women), while the mean duration of the interruption is about 10.8
months (11.3 months for men and 10.2 months for women). It is not possible for us to know what individuals do
when they are not observed in the data, but such short gaps between job observations would lead us to exclude
that they become employed in the public sector or go into self-employment. The most likely scenario is that during
the period of time it takes them to move towards another employer these young workers are either unemployed or
inactive and that no major gender diﬀerences emerge in this respect.
6of about 2.8 percentage points. Among the low educated the diﬀerence is only 2.0 percentage
points, and it is 3 percentage points for those with higher education. Among those who move at
least once in the observed period, there are no signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in the frequency of
job changes. We calculate that among job movers the average man has worked with 1.7 employers
while the average woman has changed ﬁrm 1.6 times. The corresponding numbers are 1.9 and
1.8 for low educated, and 1.6 and 1.5 for high educated men and women, respectively.
On the other hand, comparing the wage growth of men and women and distinguishing within-
ﬁrm from between-ﬁrm wage changes we ﬁnd some striking gender diﬀerences. Table 2 shows
that for the sample of all workers the diﬀerence in within-ﬁrm wage growth between men and
women is only about 0.8 percentage points. When we look instead at changes between ﬁrms we
see that men gain about 5.6 percentage points more than women on average. In particular, it
looks as if men who move to a diﬀerent ﬁrm gain (3.6 log points more than those who stay with
the same employer), while women lose (1.2 log points less than those who stay with the same
employer). In ﬁgure 3 we see that this pattern is observed at all levels of experience and that the
picture is very similar across diﬀerent levels of education.
4 The gender mobility penalty
The gender mobility penalty we observe is an overall measure of the diﬀerence in returns to
mobility among men and women. This means that it does not take into account that men
and women are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in respect of important individual characteristics, such as
diﬀerences in occupation or working hours (see table A.1 in appendix). Moreover, it represents
an average across diﬀerent types of mobility - voluntary or involuntary, for example - and may
therefore simply be due to the fact that men and women move for diﬀerent reasons. In this
section we analyse these issues further. We ﬁrst consider what happens to the gender mobility
gap when observed as well as unobserved individual characteristics are controlled for. We then
try to separate diﬀerent types of job mobility and explore whether a gender mobility penalty is
found for diﬀerent types of job moves.
4.1 Gender diﬀerences in returns to mobility
Our measure of wage growth is obtained by taking the diﬀerence in log weekly wages at two
diﬀerent points in time, irrespective of the number of years which separate these two observa-
tions. This approach has the advantage of allowing us to consider all individuals in our sample,
without imposing arbitrary selections based on the continuity of the labour force experience or
the duration of the employment interruptions.
Our wage growth equation is estimated on both men and women and takes into account the
7accumulation of labour force experience as well as the incidence and duration of any gap in the
early career.7 The equation also includes time-invariant variables and current and lagged values
of time-variant regressors which are thought to aﬀect the rate of growth of wages as well as their
levels. In a general formulation, the equation can be speciﬁed as follows:
∆wit = φ(eit,nit,g) + βfi + Xitθ + Xit+gϑ + Ziη + νit, (1)
where ∆wit represents the change in log weekly wages for individual i between time t and time
t + g, where g is the gap (in years) between wage observations; fi is the female dummy; Xit and
Xit+g represent vectors of observable individual and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics at time t and
t + g, respectively; Zi is a vector of time invariant individual characteristics; and νit is an i.i.d.
error term.
In our empirical speciﬁcation φ() is seen as a function of general human capital, tenure, and
the duration of the gap between two consecutive wage observations. In particular we assume
that:
φ(eit,nit,g) = α0 + α1g + α2eit + α3(eit)2 + α4nit + α5(nit)2, (2)
where eit is potential experience, i.e. years since the ﬁrst entry in the labour market, and nit is
the number of years spent with the same employer.
The quadratic speciﬁcation imposed in equation (2) could be easily relaxed. In particular,
Manning and Swaﬃeld (2008) have recently suggested a more ﬂexible way to account for gaps in
consecutive wage observations. Their speciﬁcation uses an adjusted measure of potential experi-
ence and allows wage growth to diﬀer according to the level of experience. However, experimenting
with that speciﬁcation did not lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerent results in our case (results not shown
but available upon request). This is probably due to the limited number of records with long
gaps (> than 1 year) between wage observations in our data. As we control for a very large set
of individual and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics, we prefer here a more parsimonious speciﬁcation
and we therefore simply regress wage growth on a quadratic term in potential experience and
ﬁrm tenure, as well as a linear term for the duration of the interruption.
The ﬁrst estimates of our wage growth regression are shown in table 3. Column (i) reports the
gender diﬀerence in log wage growth after controlling for diﬀerences in experience and observed
job and ﬁrm characteristics. As we can see, after netting out the eﬀects of these variables the
male-female diﬀerence in wage growth turns out to be about 1.3 log points for the whole sample
7Our analysis is conducted using a pooled equation for men and women but running a separate analysis by
sex lead us to the same qualitative results as those presented here. Since gender diﬀerences in levels of education
are very large in our data (52.6% of men have low education against 37.8% of women), we prefer to present here
results from a pooled equation for men and women as this allows us to highlight diﬀerences across education groups
instead.
8and 1 and 1.5 log points for the sample of low and high educated workers, respectively. We also
see that wage growth decreases with potential experience and ﬁrm tenure, and that this process
decelerates rapidly. The coeﬃcient on the number of years between wage observations is positive,
to indicate that wage growth is higher the longer the interruption.8 Other factors contribute,
and in particular wage growth is low for part-time workers and apprentices, and high in larger
ﬁrms.9,10 As we saw in ﬁgure 2 highly educated workers observe lower wage growth than lower
educated workers. Diﬀerences in the initial contract (apprenticeship vs. others) seem to matter
little, except for those with high education.
In column (ii) of table 3 we introduce a dummy to indicate whether change of employer has
occurred between time t and time t + g and allow for a gender gap in returns to job mobility by
means of an interaction between this dummy and the female dummy. That is, we estimate the
following speciﬁcation:
∆wit = φ(eit,nit,g) + βfi + γcit + δfi ∗ cit + Xitθ + Xit+gϑ + Ziη + νit, (3)
where cit is a dummy assuming value 1 if the individual changes employer between t and t + g,
and δ represents the coeﬃcient which captures the gender mobility gap.
Two main results emerge when estimating equation (3). First, once job mobility is taken
into account residual gender diﬀerences in wage growth (for stayers) are substantially smaller,
ranging between 0.7 and 1 log points depending on the sample used. Second, while the returns
to mobility for men are virtually zero, women are always found to lose when changing employer.
Indeed, the size of the gender mobility penalty is substantial as it accounts for between 3.2 and
4.1 log points of wage growth.11
Although we deﬁne here job mobility as mobility across ﬁrms and do not consider job changes
within the same ﬁrm for the reasons explained in section 2, it is useful to ask whether ignoring
within-ﬁrm job changes may aﬀect our results. So, in column (iii) of table 3 we add a dummy
to indicate a change of job with the same employer, and consider the interaction of this dummy
with the female dummy. As we can see in column (iii) for the entire sample, a within-ﬁrm change
of job is associated with an increase of log wage growth for men (1.4 log points), while women
8This result will be further investigated below.
9Notice that the INPS data do not oﬀer information on hours of work, but only on part-time and full-time
status. However, part-time work was relatively uncommon during the years covered by our data, and mainly
concentrated among female workers (see table A1). Variation in hours of work for full-time workers is also likely
to be limited. According to data from the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey the weekly average hours
of work were 39.35 (s.d. 2.94) and 39.14 (s.d. 3.13) for full-time men and women, respectively, and did not vary
much when including overtime hours.
10The data oﬀer only a highly aggregated code for occupational qualiﬁcation, which basically allows us to
distinguish only blue collar workers (the omitted category) from white collars workers and various categories of
apprentices. Further disaggregation of this variable and a more in depth analysis of the role of occupational changes
is therefore not possible.
11The gender mobility penalty is derived by summing up the female coeﬃcient and the female*change of ﬁrm
coeﬃcient. This way of computing the diﬀerence in log wage growth between men and women will hold throughout.
9loose 1.8 log points with respect to men when changing job within ﬁrm. However, this is so only
for highly educated workers, whereas for low educated workers within-ﬁrm mobility does not
appear to matter. Moreover, introducing indicators for within-ﬁrm job changes does not alter
our evidence in respect of the between-ﬁrm gender mobility penalty and does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the gender penalty for stayers. This seems to conﬁrm that, as far as we can see in our data,
the most signiﬁcant aspect of job mobility related to the existence of a gender wage gap is to be
found in between-ﬁrm job changes.12
We next ask whether the same eﬀect can be found when we control for time-invariant unob-
served individual characteristics using a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator.13 In this case the female dummy
is not identiﬁed, but the gender mobility penalty is identiﬁed by the fact that the same indi-
vidual is observed while moving across ﬁrms as well as while staying with the same ﬁrm. The
results are reported in table 4, where column (i) shows estimates of the gender mobility penalty
obtained using an OLS estimator (as in table 3), while column (ii) presents those obtained using
an individual ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator. It turns out that the gender mobility penalty estimated
via individual ﬁxed-eﬀects is always negative and very close to the OLS estimates (the latters
computed as the sum of the female coeﬃcient and the female by change of ﬁrm coeﬃcient, as
mentioned in footnote 11).
These results rely on a comparison between movers and stayers at a certain point in time.
As an alternative way to derive an estimate of the gender mobility gap, we introduce a second
control group given by individuals who are stayers between time t and time t + g but move to
another ﬁrm between time t + g and time t + g + g0. As suggested by Mincer (1986), it might
be reasonable to assume that the next period movers share the same unobservable characteristics
of the current period movers. This implies that the on-the-job wage growth next period movers
experience in the current period is a better proxy of the wage gain current period movers would
have received had they not moved than the current stayers’ wage growth rate.
The comparison between current movers and future movers is achieved by estimating the
following speciﬁcation:
∆wit = φ(eit,nit,g) + βfi + γcit + δfi ∗ cit + ρcit+g + %fi ∗ cit+g +
+Xitθ + Xit+gϑ + Ziη + νit, (4)
where cit+g represents a dummy with value 1 if the individual has not changed employer between
t and t + g but will move to another ﬁrm between t + g and t + g + g0. According to this
12By contrast, Cobb-Clark (2001) shows that gender diﬀerences in the rate and the returns to within-ﬁrm job
mobility (promotions) signiﬁcantly contribute to the emergence of a gender wage gap.
13It would be interesting also to distinguish the contribution of individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity to the existence of the observed gender mobility penalty (Abowd et al.,
1999). Unfortunately, the INPS archives sample individuals and not ﬁrms, and this implies that we have too few
individual observations at the ﬁrm level to estimate a model with both individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects.
10speciﬁcation, the gain associated to a change of ﬁrm is given by the diﬀerence between b γ and b ρ
for men, and an additional term given by the diﬀerence between b δ and b % for women.
As we can see in column (iii) of table 4, the wage change of future female movers in the current
period is higher than that of the current stayers (coeﬃcient b %). So, if the current wage change of
next period movers is a good proxy of the wage change current movers would have experienced
had they not moved then women who move to another ﬁrm suﬀer a penalty even larger than the
simple comparison with the group of stayers indicates. Indeed, we see that comparing current
female movers with current female stayers results in a gender mobility penalty of about 3.3 log
points - column (i) - while using future movers as the control group we obtain a gender penalty
of about 5.3 log points - last raw of column (iii). This result holds for the entire sample and for
the sub-samples of low and high educated workers and, together with the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimates
discussed above, it implies that the observed gender diﬀerences in the returns to mobility cannot
be simply explained by the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity.
4.2 Gender diﬀerences in mobility patterns
As mentioned above, the gender mobility penalty we observe can be explained by diﬀerences in
mobility patterns among men and women rather than being the result of diﬀerences in returns to
diﬀerent types of mobility. For example, the evidence in Keith and McWilliams (1997) suggests
that women’s lower returns to mobility are mainly explained by their higher propensity to quit for
family reasons, and that once diﬀerent causes for a job change are separated no signiﬁcant gender
diﬀerences remain. In this section we follow the same argument and try to separate diﬀerent
types of job mobility.
Since our data are derived from an administrative source, we do not have direct information
on the reasons which lead to a job move and need to ﬁnd alternative ways to distinguish dif-
ferent mobility patterns. What we can do is to see whether there are systematic diﬀerences in
mobility patterns across men and women which could indicate something about the voluntary
or involuntary nature of the separation and test whether the gender penalty is sensitive to this
distinction. In order to do so we run several checks. First we separate job moves which could
be the result of a mass layoﬀ or a ﬁrm closure from other types of moves. Then, we look at the
length of the interruption between job changes. Finally we consider whether the gender mobility
gap is diﬀerent across the distribution of wage changes.
In Panel A of table 5 we distinguish changes of ﬁrms into changes of employer preceded by a
ﬁrm closure and those where the previous ﬁrm survives. The former should represent involuntary
moves, while the latter will be a mixture of involuntary and voluntary separations. Our indicator
for ﬁrm closure is derived from a variable which indicates the date in which a ﬁrm closes down. In
particular, we consider a change of ﬁrm as being determined by a ﬁrm closure when the worker
11leaves that ﬁrm during the year preceding closure.14 Thus deﬁned, ﬁrm closures account for
about 10% of all moves across employers, and are observed more frequently for women (12.3%)
than for men (8.6%).
As we can see in column (i), it appears that a change of employer due to a ﬁrm closure does not
lead to a reduction in wage growth, whereas other types of changes of employer carry a penalty.
The situation is however very diﬀerent once we allow for gender diﬀerences in the returns to
mobility in column (ii). Here we see that changes of employer which cannot be attributed to a
ﬁrm closure generally have a positive impact on wage growth (the exception is for high educated
workers), but that this is so only for men whereas for women the opposite holds true. In other
words, we see that the gender mobility penalty is much larger, and always signiﬁcant, mainly for
job moves not caused by a ﬁrm closure. All job moves which are more likely to be involuntary,
i.e. that appear to be caused by a ﬁrm closure, are not usually associated to diﬀerent returns by
gender.
A second piece of evidence is presented in Panel B of table 5, which distinguishes diﬀerent
types of job mobility by analysing the length of the interval between two jobs with diﬀerent
employers. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary moves is not clear-cut in this
case, but it is possible to think that changes of employer which occur quickly are more likely to
be the result of voluntary or employee-initiated job moves, while those which require more time
are more likely to be involuntary or employer-initiated job separations.
We divide the interval of time between diﬀerent jobs into three segments. The ﬁrst category
represents moves which occur within 1 month, the second represent moves which occur between 2
and 9 months, while the third represents all the other job changes (the omitted category is always
represented by those who stay with the same ﬁrm). Each of these categories represents about
one third of all job moves. Men and women are equally likely to move quickly across jobs (32.9%
of job changes occurs within 1 month for men, while the corresponding percentage for women
is 33.7%) but men are slightly more likely to experience very long intervals of non-employment
after a job separation (39.5% of job changes takes 9 months or more for men, while this is the
case for only 34.5% of job separations for women).
The results presented in column (i) clearly indicate that very short intervals between jobs
could be seen as representative of voluntary job moves as they are usually associated with higher
wage growth. Intermediate and long interruptions seem to carry a penalty, but the size of the
coeﬃcient indicates that while intermediate periods of non-employment are mainly involuntary
(i.e. carry a high wage growth penalty), long interruptions might be a mixture of voluntary as
well as involuntary interruptions. Once we allow for diﬀerent returns by gender (column [ii]),
14We also deﬁne ﬁrm closures only for ﬁrms with more than 5 employees, as for very small ﬁrms the occurrence
of a ﬁrm closure does not necessarily represent an involuntary job loss. Experimenting with diﬀerent cut-oﬀs did
not lead to diﬀerent results.
12we see that a signiﬁcant gender mobility penalty emerges. In particular, we see that women
lose the same amount with respect to men when the job change occurs within 1 month of the
separation from the previous ﬁrm (2.0 log points) and between 2 and 9 months (1.9 log points),
but the gender mobility penalty is much larger when the interval between jobs is very long (7.5 log
points). Interestingly, once we allow for diﬀerential returns by gender we see that long intervals
between jobs are now positively related to wage growth for men. Similar results hold for low and
high educated individuals.
Finally, as the distribution of between ﬁrm log wage growth is diﬀerent for men and women
(the median wage growth for men is 4.4 log points while for women it is only 3.6), we investigate
whether the gender mobility gap is the same across the entire distribution of wage growth, or is
concentrated in some parts of it. In order to do so, we run quantile regressions of log wage growth
distinguishing the eﬀect of job mobility by gender at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the
distribution. The results are very clear-cut. As we would expect, the returns to job mobility are
negative and positive at the lower and upper end of the distribution of wage growth, respectively
(column [i]). Once we allow for diﬀerent returns to mobility by gender (column [ii]), we see
however that the gender mobility penalty is always higher at the higher percentiles. So, it seems
that the largest gender diﬀerences are to be found among those who experience signiﬁcant wage
increases.15
The evidence in tables 5 and 6 indicates that, although there are signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences
in mobility patterns (with women more likely to separate from closing ﬁrms and less likely to
experience very long interruptions between jobs), distinguishing diﬀerent types of job moves does
not totally explain diﬀerences in returns to mobility by gender. Moreover, we ﬁnd that job moves
which are more likely to be involuntary, i.e. those initiated by a plant closure or characterized by
an interruption which lasts for several months (speciﬁcally for the period between 2 and 9 months)
or which results in lower wage increases, are associated with very small and often insigniﬁcant
diﬀerential returns by gender. On the other hand, the gender mobility penalty is larger for job
moves which appear to be positively related to wage growth - such as those which do not follow
the closure of a ﬁrm, which occur within a very short period of time, or which result in the highest
wage increases - and are therefore more likely to be voluntary.
Even voluntary job moves might be due to diﬀerent reasons, and not all are motivated by
money. For example, data from the BHPS show that women are more likely to change job for non-
pecuniary reasons as compared to men (Manning 2003a), and that they are more geographically
constrained in their job search (Manning 2003b). So, it could be that when women move job
they do so because of marriage or the birth of a child, or other reasons related to their family
commitments. As long as these types of job moves are less likely to be associated with wage
15Fitzenberger and Kunze (2005) perform a similar analysis for Germany but they look at the gender gap in
wage levels. They ﬁnd that the gender mobility gap is highest in the lower part of the wage distribution.
13growth than moves due to career considerations, we might observe a gender mobility gap.
In Italy the situation appears to be quite diﬀerent, however. Numerous studies show that
Italian women are very unlikely to leave their job because of family circumstances and re-enter
the labour force at a later date. The typical pattern is one in which women either stay attached
to their job or exit employment permanently after marriage or the birth of a child (Bratti et
al. 2005, Geyer and Steiner 2007, Pacelli et al. 2007). Data from the 1998 Multiscopo Survey
suggest that only 0.5% of women interrupt their working career temporarily because of the birth
of a child, and this percentage is 6.8% for women aged 25-34. Additional evidence comes from
data from the 2004 European Household Survey (Eu-Silc), which show that young women are
only slightly more likely than young men to cite the need to look after children (or other family
members) or the event of marriage as the most likely reason for a recent change of employer
(table 7).
As our data are from an administrative source, it does not oﬀer information on the reason for
a change of employer. However, the women in our sample are aged between 15 and 31, with a
mean of 22.5 years, and data from the RTFL (Italian Labor Force Survey) suggest that marriage
occurs on average between 24 and 26 years while the birth of the ﬁrst child takes place between
27 and 28 years. We also ﬁnd that only a small fraction of episodes of maternity leave (about
7%) are followed by a change of employer, while changes in the geographical location of the
job are more frequent for men than women (19.5% of all changes of employer imply a change
of province for men, while for women this is 12.9%).16 Overall, these ﬁgures would seem to
suggest that marriage and fertility are unlikely to be the main events preceding the job-to-job
transitions we observe in our data. This does not imply, however, that we exclude that marriage
and fertility considerations inﬂuence the process of job search. It is possible that women choose
jobs facilitating the achievement of a work-life balance well in advance of the formation of a
family. In this case, the process of search for a new job could be diﬀerent across men and women,
in that the latter could, for example, value more certain characteristics of the new employer and
accept a slightly lower wage in exchange. We return to this point below.
5 Wage growth of job movers
So far we have controlled for job and ﬁrm characteristics using a full set of dummies for part-time
status, occupation, industry, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, and region at time t and at time t + g in the
wage growth equation. We now turn to analyse more speciﬁcally the role of these job and ﬁrm
characteristics. In order to do so we summarise the information by means of dummies indicating
whether there has been a change in one of these variables between two points in time. As we
16Unfortunately, we have information on maternity leave spells only from 1993 onwards and for this reason this
variable is not used throughout our analysis.
14have shown that a signiﬁcant part of the gender gap in log wage growth can be attributed to
between-ﬁrm changes, in this section we focus our analysis on wage growth for those who change
employer.
Table 8 presents a set of regressions which show the eﬀect of these changes. In column (i) we
report the average gender diﬀerential in between-ﬁrm wage growth, controlling only for human
capital accumulation, the number of years between two diﬀerent wage observations and a set of
year dummies. In table 2 we saw that the raw gender diﬀerence in wage growth for ﬁrm movers
was about 5.6 log points for the entire sample, and 5.1 and 4.6 log points for the subsamples of
low and high educated workers, respectively. The results in table 8 suggest that gender diﬀerences
in human capital and in the incidence and duration of the work interruptions account only for
a small fraction of these between-ﬁrm gender diﬀerences in wage growth. Indeed, the gender
mobility penalty remains negative and quite signiﬁcant and is shown to be between 4.3 and 5.0
log points, depending on the level of education.
In column (ii) we introduce a set of dummies indicating changes of part-time status (dis-
tinguishing between changes from part-time to full-time and viceversa), occupation, ﬁrm size
(distinguishing between changes to larger and smaller ﬁrms), ﬁrm age category, sector of activity
and region of work. As we can see, most of these dummies are signiﬁcantly correlated to log
wage growth. In particular, we see that the dummies representing changes in part-time status
exhibit the highest coeﬃcients overall and show an almost symmetrical eﬀect. Other important
determinants are represented by changes of occupation and changes of ﬁrm size, with moves to
larger (smaller) ﬁrms being positively (negatively) associated with wage growth. The coeﬃcient
on the female dummy decreases, but it remains always signiﬁcant, to indicate that not all the
gender mobility gap can be entirely explained by those changes.
In column (iii) we go a step further and introduce interactions between the dummies repre-
senting changes in job or ﬁrm characteristics and the female dummy. This is in order to allow
for diﬀerent returns to diﬀerent types of moves across men and women. As we can see, there
is evidence of signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in returns to mobility when a change of occupation,
ﬁrm size or region occurs.17 In particular, changes to a larger ﬁrm are always less beneﬁcial for
women than men in terms of wage growth, and this result holds for the entire sample as well as
17The return to change of occupation is per se an interesting result which would deserve further investigation.
Analyses not shown here but available on request from the authors indicate that women experience a wage growth
penalty with respect to men when changing from an apprenticeship to either a blue collar or a white collar
occupation. This could be explained by the fact that apprenticeship contracts are an institution introduced a
long time ago, and mainly targeted at a male-dominated workforce. As we argue in footnote 5, over time these
contracts became a way to facilitate young workers’ entry into the labour market and their training content
was greatly overlooked. It is however possible that insofar as a training element remains this is more valuable
for male-dominated occupations than female-dominated occupations and therefore women beneﬁt less than men
from entering in the labour market as apprentices. Unfortunately, since we do not have a disaggregated code for
occupational qualiﬁcations we cannot provide more insights on this result.
15for the subsamples of low and high educated workers.18 Interestingly, in this speciﬁcation the
coeﬃcient on the female dummy becomes very small and totally insigniﬁcant. This suggests that
a possible explanation for the gender mobility gap is to be found in the diﬀerent returns men and
women receive when changing occupation, region, and ﬁrm size.
As there are several categories for occupation, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, sector of activity and about
17 regions, there are slightly more sophisticated ways to control for changes in these variables
and their contribution to the gender mobility gap. Following Loprest (1992) and Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimuller (1999), we build a set of variables which represent the average premium (or
penalty) associated with a speciﬁc change in one of these categorical variables. The premium is
obtained as the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of a regression in levels of log wages on the usual set
of human capital variables, part-time status, occupation, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, sector of activity,
region and year dummies. The regression in levels is estimated on the whole sample, including
periods in which the individual has not changed ﬁrm, and it does not include a gender dummy.
This regression gives us the cross-sectional coeﬃcients that represent the relationship between
average wages and ﬁrm and job characteristics.
Using ﬁrm size as an example, the OLS estimation of log wages on ﬁrm size dummies and all
other controls produce the following results:
lnwit = ... + 0.043(size5 − 14)it + 0.103(size15 − 99)it + 0.172(size100+)it + ..., (5)
where wit is the gross daily wage rate and ﬁrms with less than ﬁve employees are the reference
category. We then calculate a new variable representing the premium associated with each possi-
ble combination of the cross-sectional coeﬃcients obtained. For example, the average increase in
log wages obtained when moving from a ﬁrm of size 5-14 to a ﬁrm of size 15-99 will be computed
as:
∆lnwi,t|[size(15−99)−size(5−14)] = 0.103 − 0.043 = 0.060. (6)
So, for each change of employer between time t and t-1 we have a single variable which gives us
the premium associated to that speciﬁc change of ﬁrm characteristics. We then run a regression
of log wage growth onto the usual set of controls and the variables representing the average
premium due to a change of occupation, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, industry and region constructed
using the procedure described above. The coeﬃcient on the variable representing the ﬁrm-size
premium obtained from the log wage growth regression will tell us, for example, how much of the
average cross-sectional log wage premium associated to a change of ﬁrm size is to be attributed to
18Women are more likely to move towards a larger ﬁrm when changing employer. Among men who change ﬁrm
we observe that 38.5% stay in ﬁrms of equivalent size, 37.5% move towards larger ﬁrms, and 24.1% move towards
smaller ﬁrms. The corresponding percentages are 43.1%, 35.2% and 21.8% for women.
16changes across employers. The interaction between this variable and a gender dummy will reﬂect
whether there are signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences in terms of the premium (or penalty) gained when
moving across the same type of ﬁrms or jobs.
Table 9 shows the results.19 We ﬁrst present a speciﬁcation in which we consider only a female
dummy and the occupation, ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, sector of activity and region average premiums.20
As we can see in column (i), individuals changing occupation claim about 92 per cent of the OLS
estimated qualiﬁcation premium. Similarly, individuals who move to larger ﬁrms gain about 75
per cent of the ﬁrm size premium implied by the cross-sectional estimates, while those who move
to smaller ﬁrms see their wage decrease by more than 88 per cent of the estimate predicted by
OLS. These results do not diﬀer much across subsamples, and in all the regressions shown the
female dummy remains statistically signiﬁcant.
We then consider the interaction between these variables and the female dummy (column
[ii]) and see some very interesting results. The female dummy is now insigniﬁcant, and this
implies that most of the gender mobility gap has now been absorbed by one of the interactions.
In particular, while changes in sector of activity, ﬁrms with diﬀerent age, and region do not
diﬀer by gender, we observe signiﬁcant gender diﬀerences when changing occupation and in
returns to moves towards a larger ﬁrm. The latter coeﬃcient is particularly large and is observed
for the whole sample as well as for the subsamples of low and high educated workers. This
evidence, together with what we saw in table 8, would seem to suggest that a signiﬁcant part
of the explanation of the gender mobility gap is to be found in the wage growth penalty women
experience when moving to larger ﬁrms.
6 Gender, ﬁrm size and job satisfaction
In this section we investigate the previous result, namely that women’s returns to job mobility are
lower than men’s when workers move to larger ﬁrms. A possible explanation of this phenomenon
is that larger ﬁrms oﬀer jobs with characteristics more valued by women than men or - to put it
slightly diﬀerently - that the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size is less negative for
women than for men. If this were the case, and if wages compensate for lower levels of satisfaction,
then women moving from a small to a large ﬁrm might experience lower wage growth than men.
There is already some evidence in the literature that levels of job satisfaction are lower in large
ﬁrms compared to small ones (Bender et al. 2005, Asadullah and Fern´ andez 2008). This has been
19The coeﬃcients on the variables reported in table 9 are to be interpreted as premiums or penalties according
to the sign of the corresponding variables shown in table 8. For example, the coeﬃcient on sector shown in column
(i) of table 9 (0.868) should be interpreted as a penalty since the coeﬃcient on change of sector in column (i) of
table 8 is negative (-0.015).
20We also control for dummies for changes in part-time status, for general and ﬁrm speciﬁc experience, a linear
term in the years of interruption between jobs and time dummies (not shown).
17explained by the fact that large ﬁrms implement a more rigid organization of work and oﬀer jobs
with a lower degree of autonomy with respect to small ﬁrms (Idson 1990, Garc´ ıa-Serrano 2008).
However, to the best of our knowledge, very little is known about the extent of gender diﬀerences
in the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size, and so far there is no evidence that
wages compensate for the lower levels of job satisfaction observed in large ﬁrms (Winter-Ebmer
and Zweimueller 1999, Garc´ ıa-Serrano 2008).
In this section we try to shed some light on these two aspects. In particular, we look at the
relationship between several indicators of job satisfaction and ﬁrm size, and consider the role
of wages as a compensating device. Under the hypothesis that wages are utility-equalizing, we
should observe insigniﬁcant (or small) diﬀerences in levels of job satisfaction according to ﬁrm size.
Conditional on the individual wage, however, we should observe a negative (or more negative)
relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller 1999).
In order to perform this analysis we use data from the 2005 ISFOL-Plus survey.21 This survey
collects information on a nationally representative sample of more than 40,000 individuals aged
15-65 and asks questions about economic activity, earnings, hours of work, and - crucially for our
purposes - ﬁrm size and several aspects of job satisfaction. From this data we select a sample
of employees aged 35 years or younger, currently working in the private sector, and analyse the
relationship between several indicators of job satisfaction, gender, and ﬁrm size after controlling
for a set of standard individual and job characteristics, aspects of the organization of work (such
as the presence of shift work, night and weekend work, and the presence of rigid working hours
arrangements), and the general economic conditions of the ﬁrm (whether a merger or acquisition
has occurred or the ﬁrm has been hiring in the past year). For each indicator of job satisfaction
we look at the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size when monetary elements of
the compensation (log of hourly wage and various fringe beneﬁts) are excluded or included.
Estimation will be performed by means of discrete choice statistical models, such as probit and
ordered probit, to reﬂect the nature of the dependent variables.
As we can see from table 10, we use several indicators of job satisfaction. In particular, we
consider here a dummy variable which assumes value 1 when the individual has been looking
for a job and zero otherwise (column (i)) and several variables indicating self-reported levels of
satisfaction about: (ii) the working environment (relationships with colleagues), (iii) hours of
work (hours, overtime, paid holidays, etc.), (iv) the tasks performed, (v) career prospects, (vi)
training opportunities, and (vii) job security. The table presents separate results for men (Panel
21Because of its administrative nature, the INPS dataset oﬀers only indirect indicators of levels of job satisfaction.
We performed some analysis on the indicators of job satisfaction which could be derived from this dataset, such as
the propensity to move to another job within the next year or the number of weeks of paid sick leave (assumed to
be an indicator of absenteeism). The results we obtained are qualitatively similar to those obtained below using
more direct measures of job satisfaction available from the ISFOL-Plus survey and are not discussed here for the
sake of brevity.
18A and B) and women (Panel C and D). This is in order to keep the interpretation as simple as
possible as the calculation of interaction eﬀects in non-linear models such as probit or ordered
probit is rather cumbersome, but also because what we are looking for in this case if evidence of
gender diﬀerences in the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size rather than gender
diﬀerences in the levels of job satisfaction according to ﬁrm size.22 In Panel A and Panel C we
report the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm-size dummies when no controls for wages or fringe beneﬁts
are included, while in Panel B and Panel D we report those obtained after conditioning on these
variables.
As we can see, without conditioning on the wage and fringe beneﬁts we ﬁnd virtually no
relationship between ﬁrm size and the probability of looking for another job, and this is so for
men and women alike. Once we condition on the level of the hourly wage and other forms of
monetary compensation (p-value of the joint test on these variables shown in the last row of each
panel) we see however that men in medium-size ﬁrms are found to be signiﬁcantly less likely than
men in small ﬁrms to engage in job search activities, while the results do not change in the case
of women. When we look at levels of satisfaction with the working environment (column (ii)), we
ﬁnd evidence of a negative eﬀect of ﬁrm size, and that this relationship becomes stronger after
accounting for wages and fringe beneﬁts. For women, there is a less signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
of ﬁrm size on levels of satisfaction, and this relationship does not change at all once we include
controls for monetary aspects of the compensation. Another striking case is found when looking at
diﬀerences in satisfaction with career. Here we ﬁnd a rather strong negative association between
satisfaction and ﬁrm size for men, especially when controlling for monetary compensation, but
absolutely no eﬀects for women. This pattern - namely a less negative relationship between ﬁrm
size and levels of job satisfaction for women than men and a substantially smaller eﬀect of wages
and fringe beneﬁts on the ﬁrm-size dummies for women than men - holds throughout and is
robust to various speciﬁcations.
These results point out two main ﬁndings. First, we see that men in larger ﬁrms experience
signiﬁcantly lower levels of job satisfaction than men in smaller ﬁrms, while for women this
diﬀerence is less pronounced. This could be explained by the fact that women value aspects of
the jobs oﬀered by large ﬁrms more than men. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the
nature of these job characteristics, as we do not have much information about ﬁrms or the jobs
they oﬀer. Notice, however, that we control for the presence of rigid working hours, shift work
and night and weekend work, which are all found to be more common in larger ﬁrms, and that
in Italy it is extremely rare for an employer to oﬀer on-site childcare. It is therefore unlikely
that ﬂexible hours and the provision of childcare are among the “job amenities” which would
22We note however that estimation of pooled equations with interactions between ﬁrm size dummies and sex
revealed signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on these interactions for many indicators of job satisfaction, in particular those
related to satisfaction with career and job security.
19explain our results. Other factors may matter instead, such as easier access to training, or more
intra-ﬁrm mobility for example.23 These “job amenities” are more easily available in larger ﬁrms
and might be particularly attractive for young women who are in the process of forming a family,
as they might guarantee a greater choice of career opportunities and a more satisfactory work-life
balance in the future.
Secondly, it appears that wages and fringe beneﬁts partly compensate for lower levels of job
satisfaction in larger ﬁrms, but that this is so only for men. We can only speculate about why
this seems to be the case. One possibility, which has been highlighted by the recent experimental
literature on gender diﬀerences, is that women are less likely to engage in bargaining than men.
For example, in a recent laboratory experiment participants were told they would be paid between
$3 and $10 for their participation. After the experiment ﬁnished, the participants were asked
“Here is $3.0. Is $3.0 OK?”. Only 2.5% of the female participants against 23% of the male
participants requested more money (Small et al. 2007). Babcock (2002) reports that among
MBAs graduates from Carnegie Mellon only 7% of women attempted to negotiate their ﬁrst
placement oﬀer, whereas 57% of men engaged in negotiation. Under the assumption that salary
negotiation is more common in larger ﬁrms, gender diﬀerences in the propensity to bargain over
the wage package would be consistent with the results presented in this section and would also
explain our previous ﬁndings on the gender mobility gap. Another possibility is simply that
women are less interested than men in bargaining over wages and fringe beneﬁts because they
value more other aspects of the jobs oﬀered by large ﬁrms. In other words, it is possible that
omitted variables representing job characteristics which are more common in larger ﬁrms and
that are more valued by women than men could explain both the observed gender diﬀerence in
the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size as well as the diﬀerent role of wages and
fringe beneﬁts as a measure of compensation.
7 Conclusions
This paper represents the ﬁrst attempt to try to disentangle the factors that might lie behind
the existence of a gender wage gap in the Italian labour market by looking at the contribution
of early-career job mobility. Using a longitudinal dataset derived from administrative records,
we analyse the determinants of gender diﬀerences in log wage growth during the ﬁrst 10 years
of labour market experience of a large groups of Italian workers. The empirical evidence is
disaggregated by level of education and takes into account the contribution of individual, job and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
23This interpretation seems particularly consistent with the ﬁnding that the most important gender diﬀerences
in the relationship between job satisfaction and ﬁrm size are found when considering levels of satisfaction with
career prospect and job security.
20Our analysis shows the existence of a modest gender diﬀerences in wage levels at entry, and a
substantial widening of this gap over time. We also ﬁnd that while men and women in our sample
exhibit a similar pattern of labour force participation, they experience substantially diﬀerent rates
of wage growth and that this gender diﬀerential is particularly large when considering between-
ﬁrm, rather than within-ﬁrm job changes. This gender mobility penalty is shown to be robust to
the inclusion of several individual and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, to diﬀerent ways of accounting
for individual unobserved heterogeneity, and in contrast with some of the evidence for the US
(Keith and McWilliams 1997) it remains signiﬁcant even after separating diﬀerent types of job
moves.
Using the information in our data, we consider the contribution of speciﬁc changes in job and
ﬁrm characteristics, and ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant part of the gender wage penalty is observed when
workers move to a larger ﬁrm and that this eﬀect is observed across all subsamples. We think
this can be explained by the fact that men and women care about diﬀerent aspects of their jobs,
and in moving to a larger ﬁrm women might experience less of a decrease in their levels of job
satisfaction as compared to men and therefore require less compensation in terms of higher wages.
We test this hypothesis by looking at gender diﬀerences in the relationship between ﬁrm size and
job satisfaction using self-reported data on job satisfaction derived from an additional source of
data. Our ﬁndings indicate that there is a stronger negative correlation between job satisfaction
and ﬁrm size for men than for women, and that wages and fringe beneﬁts act as a compensation
only for men and not for women. One possible explanation for these results is that women value
certain characteristics of the jobs oﬀered by large ﬁrms more than men, but also that they might
be less likely than men to engage in salary negotiations.
As far as we are aware, these are new results in the literature. They suggest not only an
explanation of the gender mobility gap we observe in the early careers of Italian men and women,
but point out the importance of analysing gender diﬀerences in levels of job satisfaction and in
salary negotiations. It would be very interesting to see whether these ﬁndings can be replicated
using data on other countries, hold for older workers, or remain signiﬁcant when more controls
for working conditions are included.
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Note: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998.
Plot of average log real weekly wages by year of potential experience and sex. Number of observations is
159,588 for the entire sample (91,859 men and 67,729 women); 73,933 for the sub-sample of low educated
individuals (48,358 men and 25,575 women); and 85,655 for the sub-sample of high educated individuals
(43,501 men and 42,154 women).
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Note: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998.
Plot of average log real weekly wage growth by year of potential experience and sex. Number of observations
is 130,485 for the entire sample (75,089 men and 55,396 women); 62,375 for the sub-sample of low educated
individuals (40,744 men and 21,631 women); and 68,110 for the sub-sample of high educated individuals
(34,345 men and 33,765 women). Wage growth is deﬁned only from the second recorded spell in the data
onwards.
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Note: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998.
Plot of average log real weekly wage growth within-ﬁrm and between-ﬁrm by year of potential experience
and sex. Number of observations is 130,485 for the entire sample (75,089 men and 55,396 women); 62,375
for the sub-sample of low educated individuals (40,744 men and 21,631 women); and 68,110 for the sub-
sample of high educated individuals (34,345 men and 33,765 women). Wage growth is deﬁned only from
the second recorded spell in the data onwards.
2
7Table 1: Labor force participation rate and distribution of years between job observations by sex
All Low education High education
Potential experience Percentage female
0 42.4 34.1 47.8
1 43.1 34.4 48.9
2 43.3 35.3 49.2
3 43.0 35.8 48.7
4 42.6 35.0 49.3
5 42.0 34.3 49.6
6 41.5 33.7 49.9
7 41.1 34.0 49.6
8 41.4 33.9 52.2
9 41.9 34.8 54.5
10 41.1 35.1 56.1
Observations 159,588 73,933 85,655
Number of individuals 29,103 11,558 17,545
Years between jobs Male Female Male Female Male Female
1 94.1 95.9 94.1 95.8 94.1 96.0
2 3.0 1.9 3.1 2.0 2.9 1.8
3 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.0
4 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.6
5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 75,089 55,396 40,744 21,631 34,345 33,765
Number of individuals 16,770 12,333 7,614 3,944 9,156 8,389
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between
1985 and 1998. Years between jobs are deﬁned only from the second recorded spell in the data
onwards.
2




Within-ﬁrm (1) 0.056 0.048 0.008**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Between-ﬁrm (2) 0.091 0.035 0.056**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Diﬀerence (2)-(1) 0.036** -0.012**
(0.003) (0.004)
Observations 75,089 55,396
Number of individuals 16,770 12,333
Panel B: Low education
Within-ﬁrm (1) 0.069 0.062 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Between-ﬁrm (2) 0.119 0.068 0.051**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Diﬀerence (2)-(1) 0.050** 0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
Observations 40,744 21,631
Number of individuals 7,614 3,944
Panel C: High education
Within-ﬁrm (1) 0.040 0.039 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Between-ﬁrm (2) 0.059 0.013 0.046**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Diﬀerence (2)-(1) 0.019** -0.026**
(0.004) (0.005)
Observations 34,345 33,765
Number of individuals 9,156 8,389
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period
between 1985 and 1998. Standard errors adjusted in order to take into account the
presence of multiple observations for each individual shown in parentheses. Symbols:
** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at 5%.
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9Table 3: Log wage growth gender diﬀerential
All Low education High education
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Female -0.013** -0.007** -0.006** -0.010** -0.005** -0.003 -0.015** -0.010** -0.008**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Change of ﬁrm -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.008* -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Female*change of ﬁrm -0.033** -0.034** -0.027** -0.029** -0.032** -0.034**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Change of job (within the same ﬁrm) 0.014** 0.004 0.024**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Female*change of job (within the same ﬁrm) -0.012** -0.010 -0.016**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Years between jobs 0.013** 0.016** 0.015** 0.025** 0.027** 0.026** 0.002 0.006* 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Potential experience at previous job -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.013** -0.013** -0.013** -0.007** -0.007** -0.008**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Potential experience at previous job2 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure at previous job -0.008** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009** -0.010** -0.010** -0.007** -0.008** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure at previous job2 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Part-time -0.426** -0.425** -0.425** -0.424** -0.422** -0.422** -0.426** -0.426** -0.426**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Occupation: white collar 0.047** 0.047** 0.047** 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.060** 0.061** 0.060**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Occupation: apprentice not insured -0.172** -0.175** -0.173** -0.178** -0.179** -0.179** -0.134** -0.141** -0.139**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Occupation: apprentice insured -0.180** -0.182** -0.180** -0.181** -0.182** -0.181** -0.168** -0.174** -0.171**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Occupation: apprentice blue collar -0.053** -0.057** -0.058** -0.051** -0.053** -0.053** -0.035** -0.043** -0.046**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Occupation: apprentice white collar -0.017 -0.022* -0.022* -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.020 -0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Firm size: 5-14 employees 0.018** 0.019** 0.020** 0.023** 0.024** 0.024** 0.013** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm size: 15-99 employees 0.049** 0.051** 0.052** 0.065** 0.067** 0.067** 0.031** 0.035** 0.035**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm size: 100+ employees 0.102** 0.107** 0.107** 0.133** 0.137** 0.137** 0.077** 0.083** 0.083**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
High education -0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Initial contract as apprentice 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 130,485 62,375 68,110
Number of individuals 29,103 11,558 17,545
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998. Dependent variable is the diﬀerence in log real
weekly wages between year t and year t + g. Estimation is by OLS. Control variables (some of which shown) include: a quadratic term in potential experience
at time t, a quadratic term in years of tenure at time t, a linear term in years between jobs, a full set of dummies at time t and t + g for part-time status,
occupation (omitted category: blue collar), ﬁrm size (omitted category: 0-4 employees), age of the ﬁrm, sector of activity, and region, a high education dummy
(All sample), a dummy for initial contract as apprentice, plus a full set of year dummies. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted in
order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for each individual shown in parentheses. Symbols: ** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at 5%.
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0Table 4: Log wage growth gender diﬀerential and individual ﬁxed-eﬀects
All Low education High education
OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE OLS
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Female -0.007** -0.011** -0.005** -0.007** -0.010** -0.013**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Change of ﬁrm -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.007* -0.001 -0.008* -0.007 -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female*change of ﬁrm -0.033** -0.041** -0.029** -0.027** -0.034** -0.024** -0.032** -0.040** -0.028**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Change of ﬁrm next period 0.002 -0.002 0.006*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Female*change of ﬁrm next period 0.024** 0.018** 0.026**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Female*change of ﬁrm -0.053** -0.043** -0.054**
- Female*change of ﬁrm next period (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 130,485 62,375 68,110
Number of individuals 29,103 11,558 17,545
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998. Dependent variable is the diﬀerence in log
real weekly wages between year t and year t+g. Estimation method shown. Other control variables include: a quadratic term in potential experience at
time t, a quadratic term in years of tenure at time t, a linear term in years between jobs, a full set of dummies at time t and t + g for part-time status,
occupation, ﬁrm size, age of the ﬁrm, sector of activity, and region, a high education dummy (All sample), a dummy for initial contract as apprentice,
plus a full set of year dummies. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted in order to take into account the presence of multiple
observations for each individual shown in parentheses. Symbols: ** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at 5%.
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1Table 5: Log wage growth gender diﬀerential by ﬁrm closure and duration of job search
All Low education High education
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Panel A: ﬁrm closures
Female -0.013** -0.006** -0.010** -0.003 -0.016** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Previous ﬁrm survives -0.005* 0.011** 0.008* 0.020** -0.018** -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Previous ﬁrm closes down -0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Female*previous ﬁrm survives -0.040** -0.037** -0.034**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Female*previous ﬁrm closes down -0.023* -0.026 -0.020
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Panel B: duration of the job search
Female -0.013** -0.007** -0.010** -0.005** -0.015** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Change ﬁrm within 1 month 0.007** 0.013** 0.011** 0.013** 0.004 0.012*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Change ﬁrm between 2 and 9 months -0.029** -0.024** -0.025** -0.022** -0.033** -0.027**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Change ﬁrm after 9 months or more -0.011** 0.013** 0.000 0.028** -0.032** 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Female*change ﬁrm within 1 month -0.013* -0.006 -0.016*
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Female*change ﬁrm between 2 and 9 months -0.012 -0.008 -0.012
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Female *change ﬁrm after 9 months or more -0.068** -0.062** -0.063**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 130,485 62,375 68,110
Number of individuals 29,103 11,558 17,545
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998. Dependent
variable is the diﬀerence in log real weekly wages between year t and year t + g. Estimation is by OLS. Other control
variables include: a quadratic term in potential experience at time t, a quadratic term in years of tenure at time t, a
full set of dummies at time t and t + g for part-time status, occupation, ﬁrm size, age of the ﬁrm, sector of activity, and
region, a high education dummy (All sample), a dummy for initial contract as apprentice, plus a full set of year dummies.
Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted in order to take into account the presence of multiple
observations for each individual shown in parentheses. Symbols: ** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at 5%.
3
2Table 6: Log wage growth gender diﬀerential by quantile
0.25 perc 0.50 perc 0.75 perc
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Panel A: All
Female -0.006** -0.003** -0.008** -0.006** -0.012** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Change of ﬁrm between t-1 and t -0.094** -0.083** -0.011** 0.002 0.065** 0.080**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Female*change of ﬁrm between t-1 and t -0.029** -0.029** -0.038**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 130,485
Number of individuals 29,103
Panel B: Low education
Female -0.004* -0.001 -0.008** -0.006** -0.014** -0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Change of ﬁrm between t-1 and t -0.089** -0.080** -0.007* 0.002 0.072** 0.085**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Female*change of ﬁrm between t-1 and t -0.026** -0.024** -0.041**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 62,375
Number of individuals 11,558
Panel C: High education
Female -0.006** -0.005** -0.007** -0.005** -0.010** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Change of ﬁrm between t-1 and t -0.098** -0.086** -0.015** -0.002 0.058** 0.072**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Female*change of ﬁrm between t-1 and t -0.026** -0.028** -0.030**
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 68,110
Number of individuals 17,545
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998. Dependent
variable is the diﬀerence in log real weekly wages between year t and year t + g. Estimation method is by quantile
regression. Other control variables include: a quadratic term in potential experience at time t, a quadratic term in years
of tenure at time t, a linear term in years between jobs, a full set of dummies at time t and t + g for part-time status,
occupation, ﬁrm size, age of the ﬁrm, sector of activity, and region, a high education dummy (All sample), a dummy for
initial contract as apprentice, plus a full set of year dummies. Standard errors obtained by bootstrap (100 replications)
in order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for each individual shown in parentheses. Symbols:
** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at 5%.
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3Table 7: Reason for change of employer in the last 12 months, EU-Silc 2004
Male Female
Found a better job 50.2 44.4
Temporary job ended 27.7 26.0
Dismissal, ﬁrm closure, early retirement 12.1 12.9
Sale or closure of own or family business 2.0 3.3
Looking after children, old, sick or disabled persons 0.7 2.3
Got married, partner’s job required to move 0.9 1.5
Other 6.5 9.6
Number of individuals 448 396
Notes: Sample of individuals from the EU-Silc 2004. The sample is restricted to men and women aged
35 or below. The percentages shown refer to reason given for a change of employer occurred in the last
12 months.
3
4Table 8: Contribution of changes of job and ﬁrm characteristics to between-ﬁrm wage growth
All Low education High education
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Female -0.047** -0.034** 0.005 -0.050** -0.035** 0.004 -0.043** -0.032** 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012)
Change from part-time to full-time 0.437** 0.459** 0.398** 0.411** 0.456** 0.489**
(0.015) (0.026) (0.029) (0.044) (0.017) (0.031)
Change from full-time to part-time -0.491** -0.465** -0.478** -0.487** -0.495** -0.455**
(0.013) (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.017) (0.034)
Change of occupation 0.086** 0.104** 0.114** 0.136** 0.034** 0.035**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Change to a larger ﬁrm 0.070** 0.087** 0.089** 0.101** 0.051** 0.069**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Change to a smaller ﬁrm -0.073** -0.075** -0.081** -0.082** -0.067** -0.067**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Change to a ﬁrm with diﬀerent age 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.014
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Change of sector -0.015** -0.013** -0.014* -0.014* -0.012* -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Change of region -0.001 0.010 -0.008 0.010 0.001 0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013)
Female*change from part-time to full-time -0.034 -0.023 -0.049
(0.031) (0.058) (0.037)
Female*change from full-time to part-time -0.034 0.016 -0.054
(0.029) (0.043) (0.039)
Female*change of occupation -0.047** -0.065** 0.000
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Female*change to a larger ﬁrm -0.045** -0.039* -0.040**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
Female*change to a smaller ﬁrm 0.007 0.008 0.003
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
Female*change to a ﬁrm with diﬀerent age -0.005 -0.002 -0.008
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
Female*change of sector -0.004 0.005 -0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Female*change of region -0.035 -0.075* -0.009
(0.019) (0.031) (0.023)
Observations 24,877 12,253 12,624
Number of individuals 14,773 6,639 8,134
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998. Dependent variable is the diﬀerence in log real
weekly wages between year t and year t + g for periods in which the individual changes ﬁrm. Estimation is by OLS. Other control variables include: a
quadratic term in potential experience at time t, a quadratic term in years of tenure at time t, a linear term in years between jobs, a high education dummy
(All sample), a dummy for initial contract as apprentice, plus a full set of year dummies. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted
in order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for each individual shown in parentheses. Symbols: ** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at
5%.
3
5Table 9: Contribution of average premium for changes of job and ﬁrm characteristics to between-ﬁrm wage growth
All Low education High education
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Female -0.027** -0.006 -0.024** -0.004 -0.028** -0.011
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Occupational qualiﬁcation premium 0.924** 0.988** 0.994** 1.052** 0.913** 1.017**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.045) (0.061)
Larger ﬁrm size premium 0.752** 0.918** 0.928** 1.029** 0.575** 0.758**
(0.049) (0.056) (0.063) (0.071) (0.074) (0.088)
Smaller ﬁrm size premium 0.881** 0.931** 0.918** 0.912** 0.825** 0.915**
(0.059) (0.076) (0.086) (0.103) (0.082) (0.107)
Older/younger ﬁrm premium 0.625** 0.527** 1.079** 0.963 0.507** 0.410
(0.151) (0.193) (0.525) (0.635) (0.187) (0.230)
Sector premium 0.868** 0.927** 0.836** 0.825** 0.874** 0.973**
(0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.053) (0.047) (0.068)
Region premium 0.913** 0.954** 0.714** 0.751** 1.032** 1.094**
(0.134) (0.141) (0.154) (0.168) (0.204) (0.235)
Female*occupation premium -0.171** -0.174** -0.198*
(0.040) (0.060) (0.070)
Female*larger ﬁrm size premium -0.450** -0.359** -0.406**
(0.084) (0.144) (0.146)
Female*smaller ﬁrm size premium -0.155 -0.009 -0.223
(0.119) (0.217) (0.172)
Female*older/younger ﬁrm premium 0.227 0.175 0.190
(0.346) (1.069) (0.355)
Female*sector premium -0.106 0.038 -0.172
(0.060) (0.091) (0.080)
Female*region premium -0.337 -0.381 -0.317
(0.366) (0.470) (0.441)
Observations 24,877 12,253 12,624
Number of individuals 14,773 6,639 8,134
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998.
Dependent variable is the diﬀerence in log real weekly wages between year t and year t + g for periods in which
the individual changes ﬁrm. Estimation is by OLS. Other control variables include: dummies for change from
part time to full time status and viceversa, a quadratic term in potential experience at time t, a quadratic term
in years of tenure at time t, a linear term in years between jobs, a high education dummy (All sample), a dummy
for initial contract as apprentice, plus a full set of year dummies. Standard errors obtained by bootstrap (100
replications) in order to take into account the presence of generated regressors. Symbols: ** signiﬁcant at 1%; *
signiﬁcant at 5%.
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6Table 10: Job search, job satisfaction and ﬁrm size, 2005 ISFOL-PLUS
Satisfaction with:
job working work tasks career training job
search environment organization security
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Panel A: Males
Firm size: 5-19 employees 0.026 -0.014 -0.191 -0.011 -0.26 -0.071 -0.102
(0.184) (0.128) (0.130) (0.123) (0.139) (0.124) (0.137)
Firm size: 20-99 employees 0.257 -0.418** -0.447** -0.403** -0.542** -0.392** -0.331*
(0.184) (0.126) (0.131) (0.128) (0.128) (0.121) (0.139)
Firm size: 100+ employees 0.020 -0.239 -0.346* -0.392** -0.514** -0.359** -0.262
(0.195) (0.148) (0.146) (0.135) (0.146) (0.126) (0.149)
Panel B: Males, with wage and fringe beneﬁts
Firm size: 5-19 employees 0.119 -0.038 -0.242 -0.027 -0.285* -0.087 -0.136
(0.172) (0.128) (0.13) (0.121) (0.141) (0.124) (0.142)
Firm size: 20-99 employees 0.421* -0.485** -0.521** -0.446** -0.589** -0.431** -0.428**
(0.178) (0.126) (0.131) (0.129) (0.132) (0.122) (0.144)
Firm size: 100+ employees 0.338 -0.427** -0.506** -0.537** -0.636** -0.485** -0.508**
(0.203) (0.153) (0.152) (0.149) (0.157) (0.136) (0.162)
Wage and fringe beneﬁts [p-value joint sign.] 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.040 0.000 0.154 0.001
Number of individuals 1545
Panel C: Females
Firm size: 5-19 employees 0.196 -0.022 -0.252** -0.140 -0.042 -0.193* -0.017
(0.138) (0.095) (0.089) (0.092) (0.096) (0.088) (0.09)
Firm size: 20-99 employees 0.041 -0.167 -0.378** -0.181 -0.044 -0.228* -0.152
(0.153) (0.100) (0.095) (0.101) (0.102) (0.097) (0.095)
Firm size: 100+ employees 0.049 -0.265* -0.494** -0.389** -0.144 -0.295** -0.268*
(0.167) (0.117) (0.105) (0.117) (0.117) (0.111) (0.109)
Panel D: Females, with wage and fringe beneﬁts
Firm size: 5-19 employees 0.194 -0.018 -0.253** -0.138 -0.041 -0.182* -0.015
(0.139) (0.095) (0.090) (0.093) (0.097) (0.089) (0.090)
Firm size: 20-99 employees 0.093 -0.180 -0.400** -0.197 -0.066 -0.224* -0.172
(0.153) (0.100) (0.096) (0.101) (0.104) (0.099) (0.096)
Firm size: 100+ employees 0.162 -0.279* -0.546** -0.396** -0.197 -0.289* -0.305**
(0.169) (0.123) (0.111) (0.125) (0.124) (0.119) (0.116)
Wage and fringe beneﬁts [p-value joint sign.] 0.010 0.076 0.043 0.249 0.054 0.000 0.117
Number of individuals 1870
Notes: Sample of individuals from the 2005 ISFOL-Plus survey. The dependent variables are: a dummy for whether the worker is searching for
another job (column (i)), and ordinal variables indicating the degree of satisfaction about the indicated aspect of the job (columns (ii)-(vii)). The
numbers shown represent coeﬃcients from a binomial probit in column (i) and ordered probits for columns (ii) to (vii). Other control variables
not shown include: a quadratic term in potential experience, a quadratic term in years of tenure with the current ﬁrm, a dummy for part-time
status, a full set of dummies for type of contract, shift work, ﬁxed hours, night or weekend work, dummies for ﬁrm economic conditions (whether
a merger or acquisition has occurred or the ﬁrm has been hiring in the past year), educational qualiﬁcation, occupation, sector of activity,
and geographic area. Data are weighted using sampling weights. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors shown in parentheses.
Symbols: ** signiﬁcant at 1%; * signiﬁcant at 5%.
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7Table A.1: Main descriptive statistics by sex and education
All Low education High education
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Log weekly wage 5.58 5.50 5.50 5.40 5.68 5.56
(0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.35) (0.31) (0.37)
Log weekly wage growth† 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.25)
Changes of ﬁrm† 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.13
Changes of job (within the same ﬁrm)† 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Years between jobs† 1.12 1.09 1.12 1.09 1.12 1.09
(0.60) (0.53) (0.59) (0.52) (0.60) (0.53)
Years of potential experience 3.30 3.24 3.73 3.72 2.83 2.96
(2.81) (2.78) (2.96) (2.95) (2.56) (2.64)
Years of tenure 1.03 1.18 1.14 1.32 0.92 1.09
(1.63) (1.78) (1.69) (1.88) (1.56) (1.71)
Part-time 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.15
Occupation: blue collar (reference category) 0.62 0.38 0.53 0.44 0.72 0.34
Occupation: white collar 0.12 0.42 0.03 0.14 0.22 0.58
Occupation: apprentice not insured 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
Occupation: apprentice insured 0.23 0.17 0.38 0.34 0.06 0.07
Occupation: apprentice blue collar 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01
Occupation: apprentice white collar 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Firm size: 0-4 employees (reference category) 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.31 0.22 0.30
Firm size: 5-14 employees 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.23
Firm size: 15-99 employees 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.26
Firm size: 100+ employees 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.24 0.22
Initial contract as apprentice 0.48 0.39 0.79 0.77 0.14 0.16
Observations 91,859 67,729 48,358 25,575 43,501 42,154
Number of individuals 16,770 12,333 7,614 3,944 9,156 8,389
Notes: Sample of individuals from the INPS administrative records for the period between 1985 and 1998.
Variable means (standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses). Symbols:
†deﬁned only
from the second recorded spell in the data onwards.
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